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RELIGION AND POLITICAL PLURALISM
Robin W. Lovin*
Normative religious pluralism is more than a description of the situa-
tion of religious diversity in which much of the human race now lives. In
normative religious pluralism, religious diversity is encouraged and pro-
tected as a positive force in social life. Historically speaking, normative
religious pluralism has emerged after the development of political plural-
ism. In political pluralism, both religion and government are limited in sig-
nificant ways, but each is enabled to maintain a distinctive role in society.
It is this interaction between religion and politics, rather than a transforma-
tion of religious belief, that makes normative religious pluralism possible.
Religious pluralism has both a descriptive and a normative meaning.
Descriptively, religious pluralism is a state of affairs that exists in human
communities made up of people who have different religious beliefs, back-
grounds, and ways of expressing their convictions. Normative religious
pluralism, however, is more than a description of this situation in which
much of the human race now lives. In normative religious pluralism, relig-
ious diversity is encouraged and protected by social practices and some-
times by law. Religious diversity is held to be a positive force in social life,
giving moral and spiritual depth to civic discourse, enriching personal and
family life, and even making the diverse religious communities themselves
better representatives of their faiths and traditions.'
Normative religious pluralism is upheld by most modern democracies,
despite differences in their religious histories and in the legal status they
accord to religious institutions. Democracy goes together with religious
pluralism and religious freedom, especially in jurisdictions where interna-
tional human rights conventions increasingly control local policy and prac-
tice.2 Nevertheless, normative religious pluralism is a relatively recent
development in human history, and it is still regarded with suspicion or
rejected by many religious movements and cultures in today's world.' Nor-
mative religious pluralism does not appeal to everyone who encounters it,
nor does it seem obvious as the only response to the facts of religious diver-
sity. Thus, an important question to ask is how normative religious plural-
ism emerges and what sustains it, not only alongside diverse religious
beliefs, but also in tension with or opposition to some of them.
* Cary M. Maguire, University Professor of Ethics, Southern Methodist University.
1. Robert BELLAH ET. AL., HABITS OF THE HEART: INDIVIDUALISM AND COMMITMENT IN
AMERICAN LIFE 225-27 (1985); ROBERT WUTHNOW, AMERICA AND THE CHALLENGES OF RELIGIOUS
DIVERSITY 153-58 (2005).
2. Carolyn Evans, Religious Freedom in European Human Rights Law: The Search for a Guid-
ing Conception, in RELIGION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 385-400 (Mark W. Janis & Carolyn Evans eds.,
1999).
3. MARK LILLA, THE STILLBORN GOD: RELIGION, POLITICS, AND THE MODERN WEST 5 (2007).
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My answer, briefly, is that normative religious pluralism has generally
been the result of political pluralism. In other words, normative religious
pluralism takes hold and shapes religious and civic life when religions rec-
ognize a stable and ordered government as the source of important human
goods, and when governments in turn recognize that they are not the only
source of human goods. When religion rejects the goods that government
provides, sectarian withdrawal or attempts at religious domination may fol-
low. When government attempts to determine all human goods, an anti-
religious secularism or totalitarianism may follow. Religious pluralism be-
comes normative, by contrast, where religion is supported by political plu-
ralism or finds its own religious reasons to advocate political pluralism.
I. NORMATIVE RELIGIOUS PLURALISM
Religious pluralism has been a salient fact in many places at least since
the beginning of the modern era. Today, human migration and global com-
munications are spreading religious pluralism into areas that were previ-
ously homogeneous and increasing religious diversity in places that thought
they had dealt with the facts of pluralism long ago. Through tourism, cul-
ture, and commerce, Muslims in traditionally Islamic societies now encoun-
ter Christians and Jews who are quite different from the dhimmi who have
lived among them for many generations. Europeans and North Americans,
likewise, must adjust to large Muslim, Sikh, Hindu, and Buddhist commu-
nities alongside the familiar pluralism of Christian and Jewish groups which
they had previously accommodated.
Thus, normative religious pluralism is an ongoing development rather
than something that can be definitively formulated in legislation or consti-
tutional requirements. Commitments to normative religious pluralism are
regularly tested against the changing realities of religious diversity, and it is
possible for a society to go backward as well as forward in its response to
these challenges.4 Likewise, there is no single set of legal or constitutional
arrangements that marks all societies which have normative religious plu-
ralism and distinguishes them from others which do not. Modern democra-
cies with normative religious pluralism include some like the United States,
where religion has an important and visible place in public life, and others
like France, where religion plays an important social role, but the public
square maintains a more strictly secular appearance. In others, like the
United Kingdom, the public presence of an established church is main-
tained in a society which also protects the freedom to practice other reli-
gions and where many citizens have no personal commitment to any of
these religious practices.5 Normative religious pluralism will not be the
same in Pakistan or Turkey as normative religious pluralism in Britain. It
will not even be the same in Britain and the United States.
4. Thomas Banchoff, Contours of the New Religious Pluralism, in DEMOCRACY AND THE NEW
RELIGIOUS PLURALISM 13-14 (Thomas Banchoff ed., 2007).
5. MARTIN MARTY, WHEN FAITHS COLLIDE 87-96 (2005); ROGER TRIGG, RELIGION IN PUBLIC
LIFE: MUST FAITH BE PRIVATIZED 20-24 (2007).
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Nevertheless, this multiform social commitment is important to the
peace and order of modern societies, and social scientists, ethicists, and
legal scholars therefore try to identify the conditions that make it possible.
Explanatory theories at first focused on a process of secularization, thought
to be characteristic of all modern societies, in which religious belief be-
comes less determinative of daily life and thus less important to individuals.
According to secularization theorists, people in modern societies are gener-
ally more accepting of all religious positions because they are generally less
committed to any of them. This explanation has the advantage of historical
generalizability, but the problem is that it has not held up very well over
time. As modernization spreads globally, it is not clear that it is invariably
marked by the decline in religious belief and practice that accompanied
modernization in Western Europe. Nor do these trends move in only one
direction. Among some groups in the United States and in Eastern Eu-
rope, religious commitment seems at present to be growing, rather than
receding. As a result, sociologists and social philosophers alike are recon-
sidering secularization as a universal pattern of social development.6
A second, more historical explanation sees normative religious plural-
ism as the outcome of specific developments in specific religious communi-
ties, rather than as the result of general forces of secularization that
weaken religious commitment. Normative religious pluralism results from
a democratization of religious life that places religion in the hands of lay
people who are used to living among their neighbors, whoever these hap-
pen to be, rather than in the hands of elites who are more eager to demar-
cate specific religious identities.
Here, the American experience often serves as a paradigm. The early
years of the nineteenth century witnessed religious renewal and increased
religious commitment, so that religious participation was higher by 1830
than it had been at the time of the Revolution. Many religious leaders be-
gan to connect this flourishing of the churches to the growing democratic
spirit among the people.7 Perhaps most important, the growing number of
new immigrants from other parts of Europe found this freedom served the
needs of their religious communities, too. Alexis de Tocqueville was sur-
prised to find that clergy of all denominations supported this distinctly
American arrangement.8 Democratic ideas of freedom and equality
seemed to provide the conditions under which all religions could flourish,
while the sources of religious conflict would be diminished and brought
under social control.9
This account of how normative religious pluralism develops seems
more promising than secularization theory, insofar as it builds on particular
6. DAVID MARTIN, ON SECULARIZATION: TOWARDS A REVISED GENERAL THEORY (2005);
CHARLES TAYLOR, A SECULAR AGE (2007).
7. MARK NOLL, THE OLD RELIGION IN A NEW WORLD, 83-85 (2002); NATHAN HATCH, THE
DEMOCRATIZATION OF AMERICAN CHRISTIANITY (1989).
8. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 295 (J.P. Mayer ed., 1969).
9. Id. at 447-49.
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interactions between religion and politics, rather than on generalizations
about the nature of religious belief and the nature of modernity. The im-
portance of the American experience is that normative religious pluralism
emerges as a polity, not a doctrine.1" It does not result from religious
groups rethinking their own beliefs or their assessment of other faiths. It
happens as religious groups claim for themselves a certain space in public
life that at the same time concedes some space to the requirements of pub-
lic peace and order. The change in relationship to other religious groups is
not negotiated directly, but mediated through a changed relationship be-
tween religion and government.
Because it is about polity rather than theology, normative religious
pluralism does not require people to believe that all religions are the same,
or to give up their beliefs that one religion is true and that others are false,
or to forego the expectation that in God's good time, their own faith will
displace the others. It does require a certain level of mutual respect be-
tween the adherents of different religions, though this may be hard to spec-
ify in the abstract and may be severely tested by events like terrorist
attacks or aggressive proselytizing. It requires civility toward religious
practices and observances, even from those who believe in none of them
and are skeptical of the social value of all of them.
Americans were not uniquely tolerant, and they certainly were not less
religious than other modernizing societies in the early nineteenth century.
Their history was marked by outbursts of violence against Catholics,
Mormons, and others whose religion was sometimes perceived to fall
outside of the acceptable range of difference. The growth of normative
religious pluralism depended neither on tolerance nor indifference, but on
a small number of dominant Protestant groups whose receptivity to relig-
ious pluralism had been shaped by an experience of political pluralism over
the previous three centuries, in Reformation and post-Reformation
Europe.
II. FROM SECULAR AUTHORITY TO POLITICAL PLURALISM
During the early years of the Protestant Reformation, religious leaders
and secular authorities sometimes ended up on different sides of the relig-
ious divide. The medieval understanding that a unified church and a Chris-
tian ruler jointly provide for the spiritual and temporal welfare of the
people no longer made sense in territories which might include several dif-
ferent confessions. In place of the ideal of a prince with broad authority
ruling under the guidance of the church, political and religious conditions
made it expedient to think of a ruler whose power was limited to a specific
sphere of law and government, but whose decisions within that sphere were
not subject to any other authority.
Like others of his time, Martin Luther looked to these local princes
who were beginning to exercise something like sovereign authority over
10. MARTY, supra note 5, at 68.
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their territories to provide order and restrain evil.11 In his 1523 treatise On
Secular Authority, he wrote, "If there were [no law and government], then
seeing that all the world is evil and that scarcely one human being in a
thousand is a true Christian, people would devour each other and no one
would be able to support his wife and children, feed himself, and serve
God. The world would become a desert.
1 2
Because peace and order depend on the restraint of evil, too much
interest in spiritual matters might actually distract a prince from the main
task at hand. People must therefore regard the keeping of peace as worthy
of honor on its own terms. Luther suggests that this is God's intention for
secular rulers:
You should know that a prudent prince has been a rare bird
in the world since the beginning of time, and a just prince an
even rarer one. As a rule, princes are the greatest fools or
the worst criminals on earth, and the worst is always to be
expected, and little good hoped for, from them, especially in
what regards God and the salvation of souls. For these are
God's jailers and hangmen, and his divine wrath makes use
of them to punish the wicked and maintain outward peace
... It is his divine will and pleasure that we should call his
hangmen "gracious lords," fall at their feet and be subject to
them in all humility, so long as they do not overreach them-
selves by wanting to become pastors instead of hangmen.13
Secular rulers achieve results by power, whereas spiritual authorities work
an inward moral transformation. "Therefore care must be taken to keep
these two governments distinct, and both must be allowed to continue
[their work], the one to make [people] just, the other to create outward
peace and prevent evil-doing. Neither is enough for the world without the
other."14
Ideas of toleration and religious freedom grow from this beginning,
but they do not follow at once, and they certainly do not appear immedi-
ately in Luther's thought. What Luther provides is a role for secular au-
thority that is at once limited and indispensable. Normative religious
pluralism begins with this political realism. Order and security are essential
to social life, and they require a government strong enough to impose them
both on those who seek to live religious lives and on those who do not.
Any religion that recognizes the value of peace and security has reasons to
recognize the moral authority of the actions that government undertakes to
11. DANIEL PHILPOTr, REVOLUTIONS IN SOVEREIGNTY: How IDEAS SHAPED MODERN INTERNA-
TIONAL RELATIONS 104-07 (2007).
12. Martin Luther, On Secular Authority, in LUTHER AND CALVIN ON SECULAR AUTHORITY 10
(Harro H6pfl ed., 1991).
13. Id. at 30.
14. Id. at 12.
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maintain its distinctive responsibilities. The reasons for supporting this in-
dependence and moral authority are largely instrumental. They rest on ob-
servations about what government does, rather than on the piety of its
leaders or the divine origin of its laws. The point is a simpler, more politi-
cal one: To have the goods that government provides imposes constraints
on those who enjoy them. If the goods are essential to religious life, the
constraints can be accepted by religious people.
Luther's stark rendering of sovereign secular authority was well
matched to the emerging political realities of the modern state, but it also
provided a way of thinking about other social institutions that provide
human goods. These, too, were taking on their modern forms and estab-
lishing the independence they needed to serve their distinctive purposes
under new conditions. Universities were gradually separating themselves
from the authority of the church and defining a search for knowledge that
was secular, insofar as it was not primarily theological, but these institu-
tions of learning were acquiring a measure of independence from secular
political authority, too. Commerce, subject always to the princes' taxes and
tolls, was growing increasingly independent of the authority of guilds and
local customs. The rules of the market were beginning to assert themselves
as a force to be reckoned with. Under the impact of these changes, even
enduring social institutions like the family were transformed as the house-
hold was increasingly separated from commerce and servants and appren-
tices became more like employees and less like members of the family.
These transformations did not happen rapidly. They continued well into
the age of the Industrial Revolution, and the slow pace of change could
obscure its continuities from the sight of those who experienced it. The
democratization of American religion seemed novel to foreign observers in
the early nineteenth century,' 5 but it continued patterns of development
that had begun in Europe centuries earlier. These patterns were continu-
ing there in their own ways, at the same time that the American experience
of pluralism was defining its normative terms.
This multiplicity of authorities, institutions, and ways of life recalled
earlier ideas of "orders" or "estates," the interdependent worlds organized
around church, home, and castle in which nearly everyone lived and
worked in the Middle Ages. 6 But the organic unity of medieval life was
gone. Farms now produced for the market as well as the manor. Church
was a matter of choice, rather than a shared attachment to a local parish.
The sovereign authority of the state was crowding out the overlapping ju-
risdictions of barons, guilds, and bishops.
The early modern world knew that it was no longer medieval, but it
had some difficulty deciding whether its new order depended entirely on
15. THE VOLUNTARY CHURCH: AMERICAN RELIGIOUS LIFE (1740-1865) SEEN THROUGH THE
EYES OF EUROPEAN VISITORS (Milton Powell ed., 1967).
16. See Ulrich Nissen, Between Identity and Differentiation: On the Identity of Lutheran Social
Ethics, in THE SOURCES OF PUBLIC MORALITY-ON THE ETHICS AND RELIGION DEBATE 152-57
(Svend Anderson & Ulrich Nissen eds., 2003).
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this new sovereign state. Thomas Hobbes famously proposed that without
a sovereign who is subject to no law and who has authority to settle all
disputes, humanity would revert to a state of nature in which life is "soli-
tary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short."' 7 John Locke, by contrast, recog-
nized that people could organize themselves in a state of nature to pursue a
variety of goods.' 8 Government has a unique, but limited, role among the
institutions that order social life. Like Luther's secular authority, Locke's
civil government holds exclusive authority within this realm of competence,
but has no authority to settle questions of faith or morals that fall outside
of it.
What Locke recognized is that there are more pieces to the social puz-
zle than Hobbes considered. Hobbes tried to secure order by subordinat-
ing everything to the decision of the sovereign. Locke raises the possibility
that questions about property and family, as well as faith, must be an-
swered on their own terms. Subsequent relations between law and religion
in Western democracies largely develop from this Lockean pluralism.
The pluralistic approach has been theorized in various ways. Locke's
own work leads to a simple distinction between public and private, and
liberal political theory has generally followed this direction, emphasizing
the importance of "public reason" in law and government and separating
these questions of justice from private judgments about the human good. 9
Religious thought, by contrast, often develops the plurality of human goods
into a theology that recognizes different, relatively autonomous spheres of
life, each of which has its own moral order and authority, resting on its
essential contribution to a complete human life.2" Religion and govern-
ment are two of these spheres, but family, work, and culture are also often
included in the list. Abraham Kuyper, theologian and political leader in
the Netherlands at the end of the nineteenth century, regarded each of
these social spheres as having a kind of "sovereignty," in the sense that
there is no power above it except for the power of God.2
While the first formulations of this theology of political pluralism were
distinctly Protestant, similar themes have developed in Catholic and
Anglican thought. Since the encyclical Rerum Novarum was issued by
Pope Leo XIII in 1891, the idea of "subsidiarity" has become part of Cath-
olic social teaching, recognizing the diversity and integrity of the institu-
tional settings of modern life and rejecting the proposition that they can be
comprehensively controlled by centralized state planning.2 2 John Neville
17. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 89 (Richard Tuck ed., 1991).
18. See JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERA-
TION 276 (Ian Shapiro ed., 2003).
19. JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 89-94 (2001).
20. For an overview of these developments in theology, see POLITICAL ORDER AND THE PLURAL
STRUCTURE OF SOCIETY (James Skillen & Rockne McCarthy eds., 1991).
21. ABRAHAM KUYPER, LECTURES ON CALVINISM 91 (2000). Similar themes are central to the
theological ethics of Emil Brunner and Dietrich Bonhoeffer. See EMIL BRUNNER, THE DIVINE IMPERA-
TIVE 208 (1947); DIETRICH BONHOEFFER, ETHICS 380 (Clifford Green ed., 2005).
22. CHARLES CURRAN, CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING, 1891- PRESENT: A HISTORICAL, THEO-
LOGICAL, AND ETHICAL ANALYSIS 141-45 (2002).
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Figgis developed an Anglo-Catholic pluralism that relied on traditions of
natural law and connected pluralism directly to the independence of church
and university.23 For Figgis, the tendency of modern law to treat every
institution as though it existed only by legislative fiat is an abandonment of
moral realism. 24 The complexity of modern social problems and the variety
of local conditions requires respect for what the contemporary Catholic
theologian David Hollenbach describes as "many different forms of inter-
relationship and community in which human beings achieve their good in
history. None of these forms of community may be absolutized or allowed
to dominate all the others. Each of them has a place within the framework
of social existence, but none of them can be granted absolute status.
21 5
There are theological differences between the Catholic concept of
"subsidiarity" and the Protestant "spheres" or "orders," but the practical
implications for contemporary social ethics are very similar. Nor should we
overstate the differences between theology and political theory in under-
standing this social pluralism, despite recent controversies over the role of
religion in public life or the place of religious language in the public square.
William A. Galston elaborates on the human pursuit of different, some-
times competing goods in a theory of political pluralism which shares some
of the same historical roots as the theological account.2 6 Michael Walzer's
"spheres of justice" likewise offer an understanding of liberal democracy
that recognizes that different criteria of right and wrong apply in different
areas of life. There is no single account of justice that we could establish to
make sense of all the distributions of human goods that a society has to
make.27
The fundamental insight which all of these versions of political plural-
ism share is that "quite stable functional requirements of human living de-
mand the participation in and maintenance of some viable institutions that
are logically prior to the state and cannot be fully controlled by it."'2 8 This
political pluralism provides terms on which religious groups can accept the
authority of civil government without succumbing to a legal positivism in
which the only meaningful social norms derive from the sovereign state.
While these terms will be unacceptable both to the Hobbesian political the-
orist, who fears the dissolution of society unless there is a single center of
ultimate authority, and to the sectarian who acknowledges no authority but
God, the development of the modern world has been marked by increasing
diversity and complexity of its institutions and a capacity to resolve the
competitions and tensions between them without recourse to an omni com-
petent political authority. This has required fewer constraints on religious
23. J. N. FIGGIS, CHURCHES IN THE MODERN STATE 40 (1913).
24. Id.
25. DAVID HOLLENBACH, THE COMMON GOOD AND CHRISTIAN ETHICS 136 (2002).
26. WILLIAM A. GALSTON, LIBERAL PLURALISM: THE IMPLICATIONS OF VALUE PLURALISM FOR
POLITICAL THEORY AND PRACTICE 3-11 (2002).
27. MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE 8-19 (1983).
28. Max L. Stackhouse, Public Theology and Political Economy in a Globalizing Era, in 14 STUD.
IN CHRISTIAN ETHICS 63, 70 (2001).
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activity than early political thinkers, living in the aftermath of the Wars of
Religion, assumed would be necessary. It has also allowed a limited civil
government to be valued for the distinctive contribution that the rule of
law makes to the human good, apart from the beliefs and virtues of the
rulers. This political pluralism provides the background against which the
emergence of normative religious pluralism can be most completely
understood.
III. RELIGION, POLITICAL PLURALISM, AND HUMAN GOODS
As we have noted, religious commitment to secular political authority
was at first largely instrumental. Protestant Reformers sought the protec-
tion of rulers who could be detached from their traditional role as defend-
ers of the Catholic faith, and the understanding of secular authority in
Luther's writing matched the understanding of territorial sovereignty that
was emerging among the German principalities. The presence of a ruler
whose primary task was to maintain peace and order allowed the religious
work of persuasion, conversion, and reformation to proceed, and the Chris-
tian's obligation to obey this ruler gave the Reformation a measure of pro-
tection from what remained a largely Catholic populace, even in places
where the ruler supported reform. 9 Indeed, the idea of secular authority
as uniquely responsible for wielding force to defend order and security was
so compelling in relation to the problems of the time that it continued even
in the Genevan Reformation, where the Protestant order was independent
and secure.3" Close cooperation between pastors and civil magistrates was
restored, but Calvin kept their functions strictly separate.
As the pluralism of modern society developed, reasons multiplied for
supporting a government that provided security and order for relatively
autonomous spheres of social life. Not only peace follows from a strong
secular authority, but also prosperity, and an unexpected degree of free-
dom. Eventually, in the Protestant settlements of North America, the dis-
tinction between civil and religious authority became the basis of demands
for religious freedom and for strict neutrality on the part of the government
toward religious controversies. 31 That religious pluralism grew in the space
provided by this civic neutrality was thus a consequence of religious com-
mitment to political pluralism that began in the exigencies of Reformation
conflict, but became a necessary feature of modern life over a couple of
centuries of political experience. Protestant Christianity made a commit-
ment to political pluralism that preceded its eventual embrace of religious
pluralism. It was history that many other religious groups would.
29. Luther later allowed resistance to the Holy Roman Emperor when that ruler took arms
against the Reformation, though he made that case on legal, rather than theological, grounds. 2 QUEN-
TIN SKINNER, THE FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN POLITICAL THOUGHT 199-200 (1978).
30. DAVID FERGUSSON, CHURCH, STATE, AND CIVIL SOCIETY 39-41 (2004).
31. JEFFRY MORRISON, JOHN WITHERSPOON AND THE FOUNDING OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC
108 (2005).
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No one system of government was dictated by political pluralism, but
experience suggested some basic requirements. Enough force to provide
security is essential, but popular consent and a general recognition of the
government's legitimacy reduces the amount of force required. A predict-
able order of life, especially the kind of predictability that comes from the
rule of law, allows people to proceed with the tasks that make social life
possible. Luther's idea of secular authority rested solely on the individual
ruler and was strongly authoritarian, but when the requirements of order
are seen in light of political pluralism, order increasingly takes the form of
a government limited by law and deriving its legitimacy from the consent of
the governed. The image of the prince who maintains order by unlimited
authority over life and goods gives way to the image of a democratic legis-
lature, constrained by a constitutional understanding of its own limited
purposes.
Part of the historical crisis through which the modern world is now
living is that we get daily reminders in the news of what happens when
these requirements of political pluralism are missing or neglected. One
thing we have learned about government is that it creates certain kinds of
human good, primarily those related to personal security and public order.
The goods of government are not all the goods there are. It is a sign of
political failure when people spend all their time worrying about what gov-
ernment is going to do. When government is functioning, people spend
their time making things, circulating goods and information, teaching clas-
ses, running hospitals, and creating art. When the goods of government are
effectively provided and maintained, they enhance other kinds of goods
and make them possible. Modern political pluralism rests on an intricate
balance, constantly adjusted, between the different systems that are re-
sponsible for all the different kinds of human goods.
Historically speaking, normative religious pluralism has grown more
from the requirements of political pluralism than from efforts to reconcile
religious conflicts. The simple idea that different religious groups would
see how much they have in common if they just thought about it appears
most cogent in places where political pluralism already has a long history.
Normative religious pluralism rests on the requirements of a political order
in which people enjoy a range of human goods that require a variety of
institutional arrangements and patterns of authority for their creation and
maintenance. Religious traditions which adapt to the demands of norma-
tive religious pluralism adjust to a civic order structured by political plural-
ism because they understand that human goods also have religious value.
They may begin, as the Reformation did, with a grim acceptance of the
requirements of secular authority, but they end by emphasizing the bless-
ings of a human common good. They become religious pluralists because
their beliefs and their experience combine to give them reasons to be politi-
cal pluralists.
[VOL. 27:91
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Political pluralism thus contrasts with the simple idea that grounds re-
ligious pluralism in a least common denominator of shared religious experi-
ence, but it also contrasts with a more complex philosophical idea that
grounds pluralism in the logical requirements of justice, rather than in com-
mon pursuit of the good. This liberal understanding of pluralism, exempli-
fied most clearly in the early work of John Rawls and the dialectical
reasoning of Allen Gewirth, requires assent to universal, logical, and lim-
ited moral principles, in order that the requirements of justice may be
known at the outset and pursuit of the good can otherwise be left to indi-
vidual discretion.32 Religious pluralism is accepted as part of the prevailing
"conditions of reasonable pluralism"33 around which a theory of justice
must be constructed, but religious ideas themselves have no direct contri-
bution to make to the principles of justice.
Criticism of these liberal theories has focused on the problems of
achieving a genuinely universal rationality when dealing with matters so
closely related to personal identity and self-understanding. These
problems are real enough, but the more basic problem with liberal theory
in relation to pluralism is that it treats pursuit of the good as an individual
commitment. Public life rests on shared principles of justice. Politics is
indifferent to the goods people choose, as long as they pursue and hold
them justly. By concentrating narrowly on the conditions of justice, how-
ever, these theories ignore the conditions required for there to be any
goods to pursue.
As Michael Walzer observes, goods are defined socially, rather than
individually.34 The creation of goods is thus inherently political, and the
principles of justice upon which we agree as a guide to distribution cannot
be abstracted from the nature of the goods available to be distributed. We
value our political community because it meets our needs, Walzer writes,
"But one of our needs is community itself: culture, religion, and politics. It
is only under the aegis of these three that all the other things we need
become socially recognized needs, take on historical and determinate
form."35
Instead of beginning with universal principles of justice, political plu-
ralism begins with the recognition of some particular good that opens a
discussion of the conditions required for realization of that good in present
circumstances and in relation to other goods. These concrete, local explo-
rations of human goods allow religious ideas and values to enter directly
into the formulation of shared goods and distributive norms. Religious in-
fluence is not restricted to private choices, nor is politics limited to the
realm of "public reason," where the rules of neutrality strictly apply. In
32. See generally John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971), Allen Gewirth, Reason and Morality
(1978).
33. RAwLS, supra note 19, at 9.
34. WALZER, supra note 27, at 65.
35. Id. (emphasis added).
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this broader discussion in what Rawls calls the "background culture," relig-
ion is not reduced to silence or relegated to a purely symbolic role in public
life, even according to liberal theory.36 It has a voice in the broader public
forum.
In political pluralism, then, religion does not simply fall silent before
secular authority, reduced to a duty to "obey and suffer" as Calvin put it.37
Luther and Hobbes, for their different reasons, may have initially accepted
such passive obedience as necessary to civil peace. Subsequent experience
shows that this formulation of the requirements of order was overstated,
and we should not expect that religious groups in today's world will give
"public reason" the same deference once granted to Luther's secular au-
thority or Hobbes' sovereign.
Nevertheless, political pluralism does impose significant constraints on
religion. Participation in the public discussion requires at least an interim
acceptance of the results of this deliberation. Whatever a tradition may
believe about the ultimate disposition of human affairs, political pluralism
requires acceptance of the rule of law. It also requires that those who par-
ticipate in public deliberations take them seriously. Religion may reserve
ultimate obedience to God rather than human powers, but it may not enter
into the political process only with a view of subverting it, replacing it with
a theocracy, or restoring it to some supposed pristine form where the pa-
rameters of public choice were defined in religious terms. Normative relig-
ious pluralism is possible only if religious traditions can understand the
legal order as a genuine good. Religion may subject government to pro-
phetic judgment. It may insist that there are other, higher goods that must
not be traded off for the goods that government supplies, but normative
religious pluralism will prove impossible for any tradition that regards all
existing politics as a usurpation of divine rule.
Political pluralism imposes significant restraints on government, too.
Order and security are not the only human goods, and the public forum
does not define the whole human good. For that reason, the state may not
set the terms for religious belief, observance, or expression in a society that
is committed to normative religious pluralism.
There will, of course, be continuous discussion, conflict, and negotia-
tion around points where religious goods and the goods of public order and
security intersect. What about religious parents who refuse blood transfu-
sions for their minor children? What about animal sacrifices in suburban
backyards? Or on city streets? What about a pupil who wants to wear her
hijab in the public high school? What about her teacher? In a society com-
mitted to political pluralism, these issues will be a permanent source of
work for lawyers, theologians, editors, and ethicists, precisely because it is
essential to political pluralism that government's authority is not unilateral
or unlimited.
36. See JOHN RAWLS, COLLECTED PAPERS 576 (Samuel Freeman ed., 1999).
37. John Calvin, On Civil Government, in LUTHER AND CALVIN ON SECULAR AUTHORITY 82
(Harro H6pfl ed. 1991).
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IV. CONCLUSION
Normative religious pluralism has characterized American religious
life since the general democratization of religion and society in the early
nineteenth century. By the end of the twentieth century, the terms of this
American normative pluralism were providing legal and theological start-
ing points for religious freedom as a universal human right.38 At the begin-
ning of a new century marked by global economic unity, the weakening of
political ideologies, and a resurgence of religious conflict, the urgent ques-
tion is not about abstract rights, but about the concrete social and political
conditions that permit those rights to become effective in social experience.
The question is whether the developments that led to normative religious
pluralism in America and in other Western democracies provide that kind
of concrete guidance, both for regions that have newly begun to experience
the fact of religious pluralism and for those that have begun to experience
it with a new diversity and intensity.
I have argued in this essay that the relevance of these lessons depends
on taking them in their broadest historical context, moving beyond the dis-
tinctively American experience of religious pluralism to a more general po-
litical pluralism that develops alongside the emergence of the modern state
itself. It is significant for the history of normative religious pluralism that
this rethinking of politics originated in the Protestant Reformation, so that
the necessary political arrangements for the emergence of normative relig-
ious pluralism were themselves grounded in religious thought about politi-
cal life. In retrospect, it is not surprising that religious pluralism flourished
in the North American contexts where this Protestant political thought had
the widest following. At the same time, the development in Catholic theol-
ogy of a pluralistic, political understanding of the common good shows that
a similar rethinking of politics is possible in other traditions.39 The initial
engagement of religion with pluralistic politics is often instrumental, but it
can develop into a principled affirmation."n
What is to be avoided in using the lessons of history are simplifications
that make the political adjustments that normative religious pluralism re-
quires either too easy or too difficult. They are made too easy when we
look at diverse religions living together and assume that the political ar-
rangements follow from the religious harmony. "You see," we say hope-
fully, "when religions live together they find out that they have so much in
common that they do not need to fight about the details." But in fact, a
38. The influence of the American experience of religious pluralism can be seen both in the
provisions for freedom of religion in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) and in the
Declaration on Religious Liberty (Dignitatis Humanae) of the Second Vatican Council (1965). See
JOHN NURSER, FOR ALL PEOPLES AND NATIONS: THE ECUMENICAL CHURCH AND HUMAN RIGHTS 20
(2005); JOHN T. NOONAN JR., A CHURCH THAT CAN AND CANNOT CHANGE: THE DEVELOPMENT OF
CATHOLIC MORAL TEACHING 155 (2005).
39. See HOLLENBACH, supra note 25.
40. Consider, for example, the systematic relationship between Islam and Western society
worked out in TARIQ RAMADAN, WESTERN MUSLIMS AND THE FUTURE OF ISLAM 166-71 (2004).
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longer view of history suggests that each religious community had to re-
think secular political authority and the general political community before
it could live in that community in harmony with those who held quite dif-
ferent religious views. Societies that oversimplify the matter in this easy
way run the risk of self-chosen isolation by groups that have not under-
taken the political reconsideration. Indeed, they risk a backlash in which
even religious groups that have long adjusted to normative religious plural-
ism will reject the trivialization of religious beliefs and identities that this
easy assumption of religious unity requires.41
An opposite error treats the adjustments that normative religious plu-
ralism requires as too difficult for persons and groups with serious religious
commitments. The alternative to conflict over religious diversity is an en-
forced, official secularism. This approach is seen as compatible with plural-
ism and religious freedom when all religions are allowed to flourish in
private and none of them is recognized as a public presence. The assump-
tion is that religious differences become publicly unimportant when they
cannot be seen. But this, too, is a trivialization of religious life that as-
sumes that only differences in dress or symbols separates one religious
community from another.
History does not conform to either of these assumptions. Religious
conflict persists where the political arrangements that support and protect
religious diversity are not in place. Enforced secularity does not provide
that support, but has in fact been used principally to limit the power of
religion where there has been a single, dominant religious tradition. The
French commitment to latcit6, the secularization of Mexican law after the
revolution of 1910, and the founding of modern Turkey are examples of
secularism as a response to religious hegemony, not as a pathway to norma-
tive religious pluralism. Indeed, it is in states that enforce a policy of rigor-
ous secularism that emergent religious diversity and renewed religious
identities create the greatest problems, because secularism ignores the ad-
justments between religious life and political goods out of which normative
religious pluralism actually grows.42
Political pluralism provides both an explanatory model and a norma-
tive theory as alternatives to answers that are inadequate to the realities of
religious diversity in many parts of the world today. Political pluralism
helps us understand how religious pluralism has in fact emerged out of re-
ligious conflict in the experience of the modern West. As a normative the-
ory, it allows religious traditions to maintain their identities in relation to
each other and in relation to government. Looking at our history in this
long view may help point the way to normative religious pluralism by
reconnecting religion, politics, and the human good. Religious pluralism
seems most likely to become normative where religion finds its own relig-
ious reasons to advocate political pluralism.
41. STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF 18-22 (1993).
42. RAMADAN, supra note 40, at 70-71.
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